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Article 1

An Anatomy of False Analysis: Original Intent
Raoul Berger'
Paul Brest's "The Intentions of the Adopters Are in the
Eyes of the Beholder"' is replete with bare assertions
untainted by historical facts. Brest is a perfervid activist2who
earlier opined that "whatever the Framers' expectations may
have been, broad constitutional guarantees require the Court to
discern, articulate, and apply values that are widely and deeply
held by our societ~."~
Thereby he imputed t o the Founders the
employment of guarantees t o defeat their own expectation^!"^
More boldly, he challenged the assumption that Tudges and
other public officials were bound by the text or original
understanding of the Constitution." However, Chief Justice
Marshall asked, "Why does a judge swear t o discharge his
duties agreeably t o the Constitution . . . if that Constitution
* A.B., 1932, University of Cincinnati; J.D., 1935, Northwestern University;
LLM., 1938, Harvard University. Honorary degrees from University of Cincinnati,
University of Michigan, and Northwestern University.
1. Paul Brest, The Intentions of the Adopters Are in the Eyes of the Beholder,
in THE BILL OF RIGHTS:ORIGINAL
MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING
17
(Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991) [hereinafter Brest I].
2. Thus he labelled me a "racist" because I concluded that desegregation ran
counter to the intention of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brest, i n h
note 3, at 10. An array of commentators, including Brest himself, ir$ra text
accompanying note 23, agree that segregation was left in place, infm: note 22.
3. Paul Brest, Berger u. Brown, N.Y. TIMES,Dec. 11, 1977, at 10, 44. Do the
Court's death penalty decisions, for example, reflect "widely" held views of our
society? Learned Hand wrote, "[the judge] has no right to divinations of public
opinion which run counter to its last formal expressions." LEARNEDHAND,THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY
14 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1952).
4. "One portion of a statute should not be construed to annul or destroy
what has clearly been granted by another." Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (17 How.)
612, 623 (1849). So too, Judge Cardozo stated, "No sensible reason can be imagined
why the State, having consented to be sued, should thus paralyze the remedy."
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 554 (1951) (citations omitted).
Similarly, once the "expectations" of the Framers are recognized, they cannot be
defeated by the Framers' "guarantees."
5. Paul Brest, The Misconceived @est for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U. L. REV. 204, 224 (1980) [hereinafter Brest 111.
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forms no rule for his government?" He declared that ours is a
government of limited powers, and that those limits were
"committed t o writing" so that they may not '%e passed by
those intended to be re~trained."~
Brest also challenged the
"authority of the Constitution" because it "derives from the
consent of its adopters*; but they are "dead and gone" and
"their consent cannot bind succeeding generations." Judges
are creatures of the Constitution and may exercise only such
powers as it confers. If it is not binding on the judges, who
have sworn to support it, whence do they derive their power?
And why are we bound by their decisions?
Brest answers, adopting a suggestion of Owen Fiss, that
the 'legitimacy" of the courts "depends not on the consent . . .
of the people, but rather on their special competence, on the
special contribution they make to the quality of our social life,"
and which, apparently, the judges themselves are t o
determine.g The special "competence" of judges to solve the
staggering social and economic problems that confront our
society is, t o say the least, debatable. Fiss advances a
remarkable justification:
Ijudgesl are lawyers, but in terms of personal characteristics
they are no different from successful businessmen or
politicians. Their capacity to make a special contribution to
our social life derives not from any personal traits or
knowledge . . . but fiom the definition of the office in which
they find themselves and through which they exercise
power.1°

Thus one becomes competent upon taking office! But a seasoned
judge, Clifford Wallace, observed, "I do not believe that one
gains added wisdom or a keener perception of social value
merely by becoming a judge."" Speaking by Justice Jackson,

6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
7. Id. at 176.
8. Brest 11, supra note 5, at 225. Compare Herbert J. Storing's refusal to
"adopt the current cant that the fundamental law is shapeless stuff to be formed
J. STORING,
THE COMPLETE
ANTIat will by future generations." 1 HERBERT
FEDERALI~
3 (1981).
9. Brest 11, supra note 5, at 226 (quoting Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court,
1978 Term-Forword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 (1979)
(emphasis omitted)).
J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION,
THE COURTS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS
10. MICHAEL
99 (1982) (emphasis added).
11. CMord Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return to the
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the Court disclaimed power based upon its "competence": "Nor
does our duty t o apply the Bill of Rights to assertions of official
authority depend upon our possession of marked competence in
the field. . . . But we act in those matters not by authority of
Brest
our competence but by force of our ~ornmissions."~~
acknowledges that the judiciary has assumed a major role in
protecting "individual rights and decision making through
democratic pro~esses."'~
Because the great bulk of constitutional litigation currently
arises under the Fourteenth Amendment, I shall focus on the
framers' indubitable intention to exclude suffrage from its
scope. Let us test Brest's unqualified assertion that original
intention resides only in the eyes of the beholder. Section two
of the Amendment provides that if s&age is denied on
account of race, the state's representation in the House of
Representatives shall be proportionately reduced.14 Senator
William Fessenden, chairman of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, stated that this 'leaves the power where it is
but tells [the States] most distinctly, if you exercise the power
wrongfully, such and such consequences will foll~w."'~
Senator
Jacob Howard, to whom it fell t o explain the Amendment
because of Fessenden's illness, said, "the theory of this whole
amendment is, to leave the power of regulating . . . suffrage
with the States, and not to assume t o regulate it by any clause
of the Constit~tion."'~So too, the Report of the Joint
Committee, which drafted the Amendment, stated, "It was
doubtfiil . . . whether the States would consent t o surrender a
power they had always exercised, and to which they were
attached."" In consequence, the Committee recommended
section two because it "would leave the whole question with the

Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH.L. REV. 1, 6 (1981).
12. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943).
13. Brest 11, supra note 5, at 226. Ely notices the "distrust of the self-serving
H. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST:
A THEORYOF
motives of those in power." JOHN
JUDICIAL
REVIEW136 (1980). Chief Justice Denman observed: "The practice of a
ruling power in the State is but a feeble proof of its legality." Stockdale v.
Hansard, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112, 1171 (Q.B. 1839).
14. US. CONST.amend. XIV, 5 2.
AMENDMENTS' DEBATES:THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
15. THE RECONSTRUCTION
AND CONTEMPORARY
DEBATESIN CONGRESSON THE 13TH, 14TH, AND 15TH
AMENDMENTS 143 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967) [hereinafter Avins].
16. Id. at 237.
17. Id. at 94.
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people of each State."ls Other facts could be set forth; Justice
Harlan concluded that the evidence is "irrefutable and still
unan~wered";'~numerous commentators, among them
activists, agree that suffrage was excluded from the
Amendment.20 Indeed, Brest grudgingly conceded that "the
adopters of the equal protection clause probably intended it not
to encompass voting discrimination at all."21
It is no less clear that segregation was left in place, as
many commentators agree." Brest acknowledges that "the
18. Id.
19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
20. Henry J. Abraham, "Equal Justice Under Law" or "Justice At Any Cost"?
The Judicial Role Revisited: Reflections on Government by Judiciary: m e
Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 HASTINGSCONST.L.Q. 467, 467-68
(1979); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Reapportionment in the Supreme Court and Congress:
Constitutional Struggle for Fair Representation, 63 MICH. L. REV. 209, 212 (1964);
WARDE.Y. ELLIOTT, THE RISE OF GUARDIANDEMOCRACY
127 (1974); Gerald
Gunther, Too Much a Battle with Straw Men, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1977, at 4;
MORTONKELLER,AFFAIRSOF STATE66 (1977); Wallace Mendelson, Raoul Berger's
14th AmendmentAbuse by Contraction vs. Abuse by Expansion, 6 HAsrmGS
C o ~ s r . L.Q. 437, 452-53 (1979) (book review); Nathaniel L. Nathanson,
Constitutional Interpretation and the Democratic Process, 56 T M . L. REV. 579, 581
(1978) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENTBY JUDICIARY:
THE
TRANSFORMATION
OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT
(1977)). For additional citations, see
Raoul Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light From the Fifteenth, 74 Nw. U. L.
REV. 311, 311 n.5 (1979).
21. Brest 11, supra note 5, a t 234 n.115. As Justice Harlan observed, "general
statements . . . that the Amendment was designed to achieve equality . . . do not
weaken the force of the statements specifically addressed to the suffrage question."
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 US. 112, 186 11.54 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). Fradshrter vigorously condemned the
Court's intrusion into regulation of suffrage by its reapportionment decisions: "Such
a massive repudiation of the experience of our whole past in asserting destructively
novel judicial power demands a detailed analysis of the role of this Court in our
constitutional scheme." Baker v. Cam, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
22. Abraham, supra note 20, at 467-68; BRUCEACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS
135 (1991); Larry A. Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A
Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 3, 6 (1981); Dean
Alfange, Jr., On Judicial Policymaking and Constitutional Change: Another Look at
the "Original Intent" Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 5 W I N G S CONST.
M. BICKEL, THE LEA'SI
DANGEROUS
L.Q. 603, 606-07, 622 (1978); ALEXANDER
BRANCH100 (1962); ROBERTH. BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA:
THE P O ~ C A L
SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 75-76 (1990); Brest, supra note 3, at 10; Randall Bridwell,
Book Review, 1978 DUKEL.J. 907, 913 (reviewing RAOULBERGER,GOVERNMENT
BY
JUDICIARY:
THE TFWNSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
(1977)); John
Burleigh, The Supreme Court us. The Constitution, 50 PUB.INTEREST151, 154
(1978); 6 CHARLESFAIRMAN,HISI'ORYOF THE SUPREMECOURTOF THE UNITED
STATES 1179 (1971); Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on
Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1037 (1992); HOWARDJ. GRAHAM,EVERYMAN'S
ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTHAMENDMENT, THE
C O N ~ T I O NHISTORICAL
:
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nation was not ready to eliminate ['school segregation'] in the
1 8 6 0 ' ~ . ' ~Brest
~
would dismiss the historical proof as an
attempt to bring "supposed new insights into the adopters'
intention,"* when the fact is that the historical evidence
speaks for itself. In light of the facts, Brest's unqualified T h e
Intentions of the Adopters Are in the Eyes of the Beholder" is a
canard.
The interpretive issue is misstated by Brest: " m e text,
rather than the adopters' subjective states of mind, is the
"Subjective
primary guide to the purpose of a pro~ision."~~
relates t o something within the mind, objective to something
Once a writer expresses his intention, it exists
independently of his "state of mind." A statement is itself a
fact.27 Brest's quotation of Justice Frankfurter is in accord
with this analysis: "the legislative aim is evinced in the
language of the statute, as read in the light of other external
manifestations of purpose. . . . We are not concerned with
anything subjective. We do not delve into the mind of
legislators, or their draftsmen, or committee members."28 Nor
do originalists engage in psychoanalysis; they rely on objective
facts-statements. So too, Brest would have it that originalists
ask: "How would the adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment
--

"CONSPIRACY
THEORY,"AND AMERICAN
CONST~MJTIONALTSM
290 n.70 (1968); RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE
689 (1976); Sanford Levinson, The Turn Toward
N REV. 567, 568 (1984);
Functionalism in Constitutional Theory, 8 U. D A ~ L.
Douglas Martin, Yale Chief Opens Constitution Talks by Faulting Meese, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1987, at 46; Michael J. Perry, Interpretiuism, Freedom of
Expression and Equal Protection, 42 01110ST. L J . 261, 295 n.144 (1981); Richard
A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN.L. REV, 1365, 1374-75 (1990); David A.J.
Richards, Abolitionist Political and Constitutional Theory and the Reconstruction
Amendments, 25 LOY.LA. L. REV. 1187, 1188 (1992); Mark V. Tushnet, Following
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretiuism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 781, 800 (1983); G. EDWARD
WHITE, EARLWARREN:
A PUBLIC LIFE 360-61
(1982).
23. Brest, supra note 3, at 10, 11. "Negroes were barred from public schools
of the North, and still widely regarded as 'racially inferior' and 'incapable of
education.' Even comparatively enlightened leaders then accepted segregation in
schools." GRAHAM,supra note 22, a t 290 n.70.
24. Brest I, supra note 1, a t 17.
25. Id. (emphasis added).
DESK STANDARD
DICTIONARY
(1944) (emphasis added).
26. FUM( & WAGNALLS,
The word "intent" refers "to an external standard." OLIVERW. H O ~ S THE
,
LAW107 (1963).
COMMON
27. For a more extended discussion of this view, see Raoul Berger, Judicial
Review: Counter-criticism in Tranquility, 69 Nw. U. L. REV. 390, 395-96 (1974).
28. Brest I, supra note 1, at 19 (emphasis added).
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have decided . . . Brown v. Board of Edu~ation.'~'Such
guessing is far from originalist thinking; instead, they found
that the framers left segregation to State control, as Brest
re~ognizes,3~
and therefore conclude that Brown overturned
this purpose.
To discredit what B r e s t denominates "strict
construction7'-"focusing on the adopters' specific intention7'-he
invokes Home Building & Loan Ass'n u. Blaisdell~'where the
majority "upheld a mortgage moratorium during the
depre~sion."~~
A mortgagee claimed that the M i ~ e s o t a
statute of 1933, which provided that foreclosures could be
postponed until May 1935, constituted an impairment of its
contract. Brest recounts that the dissenters-"the so-called four
horsemen who did battle against the New Dealn-would "have
struck down the law . . . under the banner of strict
~onstruction."~~
This is what Edmund Wilson called "the 'bedfellow' line of argument, which relies on producing the illusion
of having put you irremediably in the wrong by associating you
with some odious person who holds . . . a similar ~pinion."~
"Guilt by association'' is well enough in the mouth of a
demagogue, but it is unworthy of one who pretends t o
scholarship. For as the philosopher Sidney Hook observed,
"what makes a thing true is not who says it, but the evidence
for it."35
In Blaisdell, Chief Justice Hughes disposed of the
"impairment of contracts" clause on two grounds. The first is
Marshall's alleged statement that "[wlithout impairing the
obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be
modified."36 This, however, is at odds with Marshall's actual
statements in Sturges: "Any law which releases a part of this
obligation, must, in the literal sense of the word, impair it. . . .
The principle [the Framers] intended to establish [was] the
inviolability of contracts. This principle was to be protected in
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 18.
See supra text accompanying note 23.
290 U.S. 398 (1934).

Brest I, supra note 1, at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
EDMUNDWILSON,EUROPEWITHOUTA BAEDEKER:
S ~ H EAM
SONG THE
RUINS OF ITALY, GREECE
AND ENGLAND,
TOGETHERWITH NOTESFROM A EUROPEAN
DIARY:
1963-64, at 154 (2d ed. 1966).
35. SIDNEY
HOOK,PHILOSOPHYAND PUBLIC POLICY121 (1980).
36. B b i s d d , 290 U.S. at 430 (citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 US. (4
Wheat.) 122, 200 (1819)).
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whatsoever form it might be a~sailed."~'
In a recent survey in
The Constitution in the Supreme Court, David Currie observed
that "debt extensions in economic crises had been among the
specific evils the [contract] clause was designed to prevent, and
the Court had repeatedly struck them down" for "nearly a
cent~ry."~'Hughes' rationalization, wrote Richard Epstein,
"contains some of the most misguided thinking on
Constitutional interpretation i~naginable."~~
Hughes' second ground was that the Court is not bound by
the Founders' conception of the meaning of the clause, citing
Marshall's "memorable warning": W e must never forget that
Constitution
it is a Constitution we are expounding-a
intended . . . to be adapted to the various crises of human
a.fEair~.'~~
That selfsame Constitution provides for change by
the people through amendment, not change by the courts.
McCuUoch merely voiced a plea for some "choice of means" to
execute an existing power, not t o alter its meaning." It had
immediately come under attack, and Marshall leapt to the
defense saying, "It does not contain the most distant allusion to
any extension by construction of the powers of congress."42And
he specifically declared that judicial review "cannot be the
assertion of a right t o change that instrument/43 a
reaffirmation of Marbury v. Madison's invalidation of Congress'
attempt to alter the original jurisdiction of the Supreme

37. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197, 200 (1819).
38. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE C O N ~ T I OINN THE SUPREME COUIZT: THE
SECONDCENTURY,
1888-1986, at 211 (1990). Leonard Levy wrote, "The case seemed
to be exactly the sort for which the [contract] clause had been designed. . . . In
effect the Court added to the contract clause the words 'except in emergencies.' But
Hughes pretended that the Court had decided as the Framers would have . . . ."
LEONARDW. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT
AND THE FRAMEXB' CONSTITUTION
327-28
(1988). Lino Graglia considers that Blaisdell "effectively [read] the Contracts Clause
. . . out of the Constitution." Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constikction:
Posner on Bork, 44 STAN.L. REV. 1019, 1031 (1992).
39. Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U.
CHI. L. REV. 703, 735 (1984).
40. BlaisdeU, 290 U.S. at 443 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819) (emphasis omitted)).
41. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408, 415 (1819).
MARSHALL'S
42. John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in JOHN
DEFENSEOF McCulloch u. Maryland 185 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) [hereinafter
MARSHALL'SDEFENSE].
43. Id. at 209 (emphasis added).
44. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Ever ready to replace factual analysis with
a glittering phrase, Brest quotes a remark of Paul Freund: "We ought not to read
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Brest contends that during its 200-year history the focus of
constitutional interpretation has been on "text rather than
intention^."^^ Yet Chief Justice Marshall wrote that he could
cite from the common law "the most complete evidence that the
intention is the most sacred rule of interpret~tion."~~
Noticeably absent from Brest's article is any reference to the
400-year common law history t o which Marshall referredO4'
Jefferson Powell, an activist critic of original intention, noted
that the American "victors viewed the 'revolution of 1800' [the
election of Jefferson] as the people's endorsement of the
approach to Constitutional interpretation embodied" in the
doctrine of "original intent."48 "By the outbreak of the Civil
War," he concluded, "intentionalism in the modem sense
reigned ~uprerne."~'A few citations t o confirmatory evidence
should suffice. In 1838 the Supreme Court stated that
construction "must necessarily depend on the words of the
Constitution; the meaning and intention of the convention
which framed and proposed it for adoption and ratification to
the conventions . . . in the several states . . . to which the Court
That
has always resorted in construing the Constit~tion."~~
practice was in harmony with the pronouncements of Jefferson
and Madison. In his inaugural address, Jefferson pledged t o
administer the Constitution "according to the safe and honest
meaning contemplated by the plain understanding of the people
a t the time of its adoption-a meaning t o be found in the
explanations of those who advocated . . . it."' Madison wrote

the Constitution like a last will and testament lest it become one." Brest I, supra
note 1, at 21. The Article V provision for amendment forfends that dread prospect.
And Freund to the contrary notwithstanding, Justice Story declared that the
Constitution should have "a fixed, uniform, permanent construction. . . . not
dependent upon the passions or parties of particular times, but the same
yesterday, to-day and forever." 1 JOSEPH
STORY,COMMENTARIES
ON THE
C O N S T ~ I OOFNTHE UNITEDSTATES5 426 (5th ed. 1905).
45. Brest I, supra note 1, at 17.
46. MARSHALL'S
DEFENSE,supra note 42, at 167.
47. See Raoul Berger, "Original Intention* in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO.
WASH.L. REV. 296 (1986); Raoul Berger, The Founders' Views-According to
Jefferson Powell, 67 TM.L. REV. 1033 (1989).
48. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 934 (1985).
49. Id. at 947.
50. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838).
51. 4 JONATHAN
ELLIOT,
THE DEBATESIN THE SEVERALSTATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERALCONST~~UTION
446 (2d ed. 1836) (emphasis
omitted).
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that if "the sense in which the Constitution was accepted and
ratified by the nation . . . be not the guide in expounding it,
there can be no security for a consistent and stable
[government], more than for a faithful exercise of its
powers."52
Inasmuch as the great bulk of constitutional litigation
nowadays arises under the Fourteenth Amendment, it needs to
be noted that in the 39th Congress a proponent of the
Amendment, Senator Charles Sumner, stated: "Every
Constitution embodies the principles of its Framers. It is a
transcript of their minds. If its meaning in any place is open to
doubt . . . we cannot err if we turn to the framer^."^^ To this
may be added a unanimous January 1872 Report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, signed by senators who had voted for the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, respecting
a plea for a statutory grant of women's suffrage:
In construing the Constitution we are compelled to give i t
such interpretation as will secure the result intended to be
accomplished by those who framed i t and the people who
adopted it. . . . A construction which would give the phrase a
meaning differing from the sense in which i t was understood
and employed by the people when they adopted the
Constitution, would be as unconstitutional as a departure
from the plain and express language of the C o n s t i t ~ t i o n . ~ ~

Justice Holmes wrote, "Of course, the purpose of written
instruments is to express some intention or state of mind of
those who write them, and it is desirable to make that purpose
effectual."55 Brest himself acknowledges, "it seems strange to
imagine that the adopters of a provision could intend that
others might apply it differently than they
Nevertheless Brest attributes t o the British legal
philosopher H.L.A. Hart the view that "adopters m a y intend to
52. 9 JAMES
MADISON,THE WRITINGSOF JAMES
MADISON:1819-1836, at 191
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
53. CONG.GLOBE,39th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1866).
54. Avins, supm note 15, at 571-72.
L. REV.
55. Oliver W. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV.
417 (1899), reprinted in OLIVERW. HOLMES,COLLECTED
LEGALPAPERS206 (1921);
see also Wirts v. Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 468 (1968); United States v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 US. 534, 543-44 (1940); Boston Sand & Gravel Co.
v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Tremaine,
133 F.2d 827, 830 (2d Cir. 1943) (L. Hand, J.).
56. Brest I, supra note 1, a t 19.
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delegate discretion to subsequent decisionmakers" to override
the clear legislative intente5? Where was that intention
expressed? Under American doctrines, legislative power may
not be transferred to the judiciary." Minimally such a
delegation calls for clear evidence that such was the
draftsmen's intention, particularly because the Founders had a
"profound fear" of judicial d i s c r e t i ~ n , of
~ ~ the "judges'
imposition of their personal views7s0 under the guise of
interpretation. Of course, words in a legal document "are
simply delegations t o others . . . [to apply] them to particular
things or oc~asions."~'Thus "transportation" envisioned by
oxcart may later comprehend carriage by a plane. This
exemplifies the application of a principle and is not to be
confused with its abrogation, e.g., substitution of "one personone vote" for the irrefutable exclusion of suffrage from the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In any event, the framers, as we have noted, meant
original intention to govern. Brest argues, however, that "a
choice must be made," and that the adopters "cannot determine
the
But judges may not substitute their choice for
that of the Framers; t o do so is to rewrite the Constitution.
Even a flaming activist, Judge J. Skelly Wright, wrote that the
Framers have already made the choices, and judges' "value
choices are to be made only within the parameters" of those
choices." Writing in 1939, Jacobus tenBroek said that the
Court "has insisted, with almost uninterrupted regularity, that
the end and object of Constitutional construction is the
discovery of the intention of those persons who formulated the
instrument ."64
57. Id. at 20 (emphasis added). Hart regarded the vision of judges as
"legislators" an Englishman's "nightmare." SHANNON
C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTIONIN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE
BEFORE JOHN
MARSHALL 146 (1990).
58. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121-22 (1976).
S. WOOD,THE CREATION
OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC,
1776-1787,
59. GORDON
at 298 (1969).
60. Powell, supra note 48, at 891.
61. Brest I, supra note 1, at 20 (citing Charles Curtis, A Better Theory of
Legal Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV.407, 422 (1950)).
62. Id. at 22.
63. J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Dadition, and the
Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 785 (1971). Brest dismisses the view that
"choice is [often] based on the justices' personal whim" because they operate
"against the background of a tradition which constrains these choices." Brest, supra
note 3, at 22. Compare Justice Black's more realistic evaluation, infra note 89.
64. Jacobus tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic
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Here the law coincides with common sense. Who better
knows what he means than the writer?--certainly not the
reader. John Selden, a preeminent seventeenth century scholar,
stated that "a Man's Writing has but one true Sense, which is
that which the Author meant when he writ it.'a5 His
illustrious precursors, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, were of
the same opinion.66 After a hiatus, the House of Lords
declared in 1992 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson that "we are
much more likely to find the intention of Parliament [in its
proceedings] than anywhere else."?
It is open t o Brest to differ with the centuries-old practice,
but it is misleading t o treat it as a recent heresy, a rejection of
"well-established precedents under the guise of returning t o the
original under~tanding."~ Of the same nature is Brest's
assertion that originalists "would have the Court reject the
long-standingseries of decisions holding that the Bill of Rights
applies t o the states through the Fourteenth A~nendment.'"~
The incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth
Amendment was "discovered" in 1947 by Justice Black
dissenting in Adamson v. C a l i f ~ r n i a .For
~ ~ 135 years, Justices
Harlan and Stewart reminded the Court, every member agreed
that the Founders exempted the states from the Bill of
Rights.?' This, Louis Henkin observed, was "the consistent,
often reaffirmed, and almost unanimous jurisprudence of the
Co~rt."'~
What is it that renders the decisions of the last 40

Aids in Constitutional Construction: The Intent Theory of Constitutional
Construction, 27 CAL. L. REV.399, 399 (1939).
BEINGTHE DISCOURSES
OF JOHN
SELDEN,ESQ.
65. JOHN SELDEN,TABLE-TALK:
10 (2d ed. 1696).
66. THOMAS
HOBBES,LEVIATHAN*18: "The judge is to be guided by the Gnal
causes, for which the law was made . . . the knowledge of which final causes is in
the legislature." Locke stated,
when a man speaks to another, it is . . . [to] make known his ideas to
the hearer. That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the
speaker . . . this is certain, their signification, in his use of them, is
limited to his ideas, and they can be signs of nothing else.
J O H N LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING
THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING
204-06
(Raymond Wilburn ed., 1942).
67. Pepper v. Hart, 3 W.L.R. 1032, 1057 (1992) (citations omitted).
68. Brest I, supra note 1, at 23 (emphasis added).
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. 332 US. 46, 80-90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
71. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 173 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
72. Louis Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73
YALEL J . 74, 76 (1963).
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years sacrosanct whereas the Warren Court toppled those of
the prior 135 years like dominoes?73 Brest, who evinces no
compunction in jettisoning the basic principle of our democratic
system-government by consent of the governed-is aghast
that the Warren Court decisions should be questioned. Why
must we be bound by the "dead hand" of Earl Warren? Activist
theology, to borrow from Mark Tushnet, is "plainly designed to
protect the legacy of the Warren C ~ u r t . " ? ~
To bolster his contention that it is "obviously impossible to
describe [the] specific intentions" of the "multitudes of people"
engaged in the "drafting and ratifying of the Constitution,"
Brest again invokes Frankfurter, who avoided speaking of
"legislative intent."75 But Frankfurter read a statute "in the
light of other external manifestations of purpose."76
Originalists would agree that "[wle are not concerned with . . .
delv[ing] into the mind of legislators or their draftsmen, or
committee members.'"? But Justice Frankfurter stated, "It has
never been questioned in this Court that committee reports, as
well as statements by those in charge of a bill or of a report,
are authoritative elucidations of the scope of a measure."78
Our representative form of government postulates, moreover,
that the people speak through the voice of their delegates.
Obviously, a nation of many millions cannot act by a monster
town-meeting. Lincoln considered that the Framers "fairly
represented the opinion and sentiment of the whole nation at
that time."7gJefferson found the meaning of the people in the
explanations of those who advocated adoption of the

73. "The list of opinions destroyed by the Warren Court reads like a table of
contents from an old constitutional law casebook." PHlW B. KURLAND,PoLJ!~'Ics,
THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE WARRENCOURT 90-91 (1970). The "result-oriented
jurisprudence" of the Warren Court "witnessed the crumbling of sometimes centuryold precedents and the charting of new political and social goals." Stanley I.
Kutler, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment: A History or Ahistorical?, 6
HASTINGSCONST.L.Q. 511, 514 (1979) (book review).
74. Mark V. Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structuml Review and Prophecy, 8 U .
DAYTONL. REV.809, 811 (1983).
75. Brest I, supra note 1, at 19.
76. Id. (citing Felix Frankfurter, Some RefEections on the Reading of Statutes,
1947 COLUM.L. REV. 527, 538-39 (1947)).
77. Id.
78. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 399-400
(1951) (Franbfurter, J., dissenting).
79. Abraham Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute, New York City (Feb. 27,
1860), in ABRAHAMLINCOLN:
SPEECHESAND WRITINGS1859-1865, at 111 (1989).
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Constituti~n.~~
Of the 1866 period, Morton Keller found that
"most congressional Republicans were aware of (and shared)
Chief Justice
their constituents' hostility to black s~ffrage."~'
Thomas Cooley, a contemporary of the Fourteenth Amendment,
wrote that "we are endeavoring t o arrive at the intent of the
people through the discussions and deliberations of their
repre~entatives.''~~
Brest's argument is a rehash of that made
by tenBroek in 1939. Unmoved thereby, the courts have
continued t o cite legislative history.
In the same vein, Brest urges that what was adopted "is
not a set of intentions but a set of
In 1787 the AntiFederalists played on the fears aroused by the text of the
Constitution; t o allay such fears the Federalists represented
that those terms were more restricted than was paintedeS4
Thus it was not merely the text that was adopted, but the text
as explained by its proponents. Now to repudiate those
representations is, as Justice Story declared in similar context,
t o commit a "fraud upon the whole American pe~ple."'~
Arguing for broad judicial discretion in construing
"imprecise" terms, Brest cites Justice Frankfurter's statement,
"Great concepts like . . . 'due process of law' . . . were purposely
left t o gather meaning from e~perience.'"~History is t o the
80. Supra text accompanying note 51.
81. MORTON
KELCER,
AFFAIRS OF STATE67 (1977). "[Nlational enfranchisement
of the Negro - which meant Negro voting in the North - was out of the question."
WILLIAM GILLETTE,THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICSAND THE PASSAGEOF THE
FIFTEENTHAMENDMENT
32 (1965). The "most significant decisions of the [the
Warren] Court overturned legislation that substantial local, and probably national,
majorities supported both in theory . . . and in practice." Mark V. Tushnet,
Dialects of Legal Histog, 57 TEX.L. REV. 1295, 1303 (1979) (reviewing G. EDWARD
OF AMERICAN
LEGALTHOUGHT(1978)).
WHITE,PATTERNS
LIMITATIONS
102
82. THOMASM. COOLEY,TREATISEON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
(7th ed. 1903).
83. Brest I, supra note 1, at 20.
84. Hamilton met Brutus' gloomy prognostications with the assertion that "the
judiciary is next to nothing." THE FEDERALIST
NO. 78, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
85. "If the Constitution was ratified under the belief sedulously cultivated on
all sides that such protection was afforded, would it not now be a fraud upon the
whole people to give it a different construction to its powers . . .?" 2 Story, supra
note 44, at 8 1084.
86. Brest I, supra note 1, at 21. An apostle of judicial self-restraint,
Frankfurter yet "played a pivotal role" in the overthrow of segregated schools,
JOSEPH
P. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER
85 (1975),
notwithstanding that his law clerk, Alexander Bickel, who at his request had
studied the debates of the 39th Congress, advised him that "it is impossible to
conclude that the 39th Congress intended that segregation be abolished; impossible
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contrary. On the eve of the Convention, Hamilton declared,
"The words 'due process' have a precise technical import, and
are only applicable to the process and proceedings of the courts
of justice; they can never be referred to a n act of
legislature.'"' It is the legislature, not the courts, to whom
was confided "the whole domain of social and economic fact.""
Charles Curtis, whom Brest eulogizes, wrote that the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause "was as firred
and definite as the common law could make a phrase. . . . It
meant a procedural p r ~ c e s s . ' 'And
~ ~ he asked, "But who made
it a large generality? Not they [the Founders]. We [the Court]
did.'*' Frankfurter himself once shared that view, writing in
1925 that the contents of the Due Process Clauses "are derived
from the disposition of the Justices.'*' It is a long-established
also to conclude that they foresaw it might be, under the language they were
adopting," RICHARDKLUGER,SIMPLE JUSTICE
654 (1976). In less pressurized
circumstances, Frankfurter declared that "an amendment to the Constitution should
be read in a 'sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its
adoption." Adamson v. California, 332 US. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Again, "very specific provisions" such as a prohibition against ''bills of
attainder" must be read as "defined by history." United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303, 321 (1946). "Their meaning was so settled by history that definition was
superfluous." Id. The meaning of "due process" was at least as firmy settled. Later
he wrote, "Legal doctrines . . . derive meaning and content from the circumstances
that gave rise to them and from the purposes they were designed to serve. To
these they are bound as is a live tree to its roots." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 50
(1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). He acknowledged that the (alleged) "vagueness"
of due process "readily lends itself to make of the Court a third chamber with
drastic veto power." Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function,
69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 229 (1955). Earlier he had written that by means of the
Due Process Clause the Supreme Court was "putting constitutional compulsion
behind the private judgment of its members upon disputed and difficult questions
of social policy." KURLAND,supra note 73, at xiv.
HAMILTON 35 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E.
87. 4 THE PAPERSOF ALEXANDER
Cooke eds., 1962). For Hamilton's summarization of the common law, see Raoul
Berger, "Law of the Land" Reconsidered, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1979).
88. Brest I, supra note 1, at 21.
89. Charles Curtis, Review and Majori6y Ruk, in THE SUPREMECOURTAND
SUPREME
LAW170, 177 (Edmund Cahn ed., 1954). Compare with this Frankfurter's
statement that due process is of "convenient vagueness" so that the "Court is
compelled to put meaning in the Constitution." F E FRANKmJWrEFt,
~
MR. J U ~ C E
HOLMESAND THE SUPREME COURT7 (1938). Justice Black more truly declared,
"there is no constitutional support whatever for this Court to use the Due h s s
Clause as though it provided a blank check to alter the meaning of the
Constitution as written so as to add to it substantive constitutional changes which
a majority of the Court at any given time believes are needed to meet present-day
problems." Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 US. 663, 675-76 (1966) (Black,
J., dissenting).
90. Curtis, supra note 89, at 177.
91. ~EJCANDERM. BICKEL,THE SUPREMECOURTAND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
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canon that when the draftsmen employ common law terms, the
common law "definitions," as Justice Story put it, "are
necessarily included, as much as if they stood in the text.'@2
The words "due process," the Court stated, were used in the
Fourteenth Amendment "in the same sense and with no greater
extent" than in the Fifth Amend~nent.~~
In sum, to borrow
from Edward Corwin, "no one at the time of the framing and
adoption of the Constitution had any idea that this clause did
more than consecrate a method of procedure against accused
persons, and the modern doctrine of due process of law . . .
could never have been laid down except in defiance of
history."s4
We should not leave so-called "general terms" without
some reference t o "equal protection of the law," first met in
1866. John Hart Ely considers the words "ins~rutable.'*~
Brest
25 (1978).
92. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820). Chief Justice
Marshall stated that if a word was understood in a certain sense "when the
constitution was framed. . . . The Convention must have used the word in that
sense . . . ." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824). This was the
common law rule: "If a statute make use of a Word the Meaning of which is well
known at the Common Law, such Word shall be taken in the same Sense it was
A NEW ABRIDGMENT
OF THE
understood at the Common Law." 4 MAITHEW BACON,
LAW "Statute" I(4) (1786). The Court noted that the lawyers in the Convention
expressed their conclusions "in terms of the common law, confident that they could
be shortly and easily understood." Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 109 (1925).
Brest's argument that "it simply cannot be assumed that the laymen in the
convention used a "phrase in its technical sense," Brest I, supra note 1, at 27-29,
"simply" betrays unfamiliarity with the settled practice.
Brest understands full well that the original meaning of constitutional terms is
t o be given effect:
[Sluppose that the Constitution provided that some a d s were to be
performed "biweekly." At the time of the framing of the Constitution, this
meant only "once every two weeks"; but modern dictionaries . . . now
report "twice a week." To construe the provision now to mean
"semiweekly" would certainly be a change of meaning (and an improper
one at that).
DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
PAUL BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTWUTIONAL
MATERIALS
146 n.38 (1975).
93. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
94. EDWARD
S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREMECOURT:A HISTORY
OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY118-19 (1934). In 1970 the Court recalled the
"era when the Court thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave it power to strike
down state laws 'because they may be unwise.' . . . That era has long ago passed
into history." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970); see also Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
95. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST:
A THEORYOF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
98 (1980). Wallace Mendelson regards the words as so broad as to be almost
meaningless. Mendelson, supra note 20, at 451.
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comments that "because of its indeterminacy, the clause does
not offer much guidance even in resolving particular issues of
discrimination based on race.'@6To invalidate a statute under
cover of an "indeterminate clause" is t o subvert the
Constitution. Federal supervision of state action, said Justice
Brandeis on behalf of the Court, "is in no case permissible
except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized
or delegated to the United States.'@' Federal interference,
"except as thus permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the
State."98 Given the grudging, jealous surrender by the states
it should
of limited jurisdiction to the federal govern~nent?~
not lightly be assumed that the states have consented by an
"indeterminate clause" to curtailment of the sovereignty they
were at pains to reserve.
Of a certainty the Equal Protection Clause is not
boundless, for the framers excluded suffrage and segregation;
and they repeatedly rejected proposals to ban a l l
discrimination.lw This is precisely the sort of situation in
which Senator Sumner counselled resort t o the framers'
explanation^.'^' But that does not cross Brest's mind. For
him, in interpreting a clause "as broad as the equal protection
clause, one must posit a theory or principle for the clause."102
A page of history, however, is worth a volume of theorizing.lo3
The "starting point7'in construction of a clause "as broad as the
equal protection clause," he remarks, should be "our
understanding of the adopters' purposes."104 He confines
himself to speculation about the four classes t o which the
clause might apply.lo5 The framers, however, were
preoccupied with protection of a particular class-the
emancipated negroes; they were almost exclusively concerned

96. Brest 11, supra note 5, at 232.
97. Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, 304 U S . 64, 79 (1938) (emphasis added); see also
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 325 (1816).
98. Erie, 304 U.S. a t 79.
THE FOUNDERS'DESIGN78-79, 171-73 (1987).
99. RAOULBERGER,FEDERALISM:
100. RAOULBERGER,GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY:
THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE
FOURTEENTHAMENDMENT
163-64 (1977).
101. Supra text accompanying note 53.
102. Brest I, supra note 1, a t 21 (emphasis added).
103. "History, to most authors of the Constitution, was more valuable than
THE AMERICAN
political theory-because it was more real." FORRESTMCDONALD,
PRESIDENCY:
AN INTELLECTUAL
HIS~ORY67 (1994).
104104. Brest I, supra note 1, a t 21.
105. Id.
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with the content of equal protection, with what rights were to
be protected.
Let me encapsulate the facts. Northern outrage had been
ignited by the Black Codes which, as Senator Henry Wilson put
it, "practically make slaves of men we have declared t o be
free."'" In response, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibited
discrimination with respect to the right to own property, to
contract, and to have access t o the courts,lo7rights designed
t o enable the liberated slaves to exist. After reviewing the
legislative history the Court concluded in 1966 that the Act
conferred a "limited category of rights."lo8 The Fourteenth
Amendment, regarded without demur as "identical" with the
Act, and designed to embody it and thus secure it against
repeal,log substituted for the negative ban of discrimination
the positive equal protection. Their affinity was disclosed by
the explanation of Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio that the Civil
Rights Bill secures "equality of protection in those enumerated
civil rights which the States may deem proper to confer upon
any races."l1° Leonard Myers of Pennsylvania explained that
the Amendment required that each state shall provide for
"equal protection to life, liberty, and property, equal rights t o
sue and be sued, to inherit, make contracts, and give
testimony,""' virtually a reprise . of Shellabarger's
explanation. Both Shellabarger and Myers allied equal
protection to an enumerated and "limited category" of rights.
While Senator James Patterson of New Hampshire was
"opposed to any law discriminating against [blacks] in the
security and protection of life, liberty, person, property, and the
proceeds of their labor'' he emphasized that "[bleyond this I am
not prepared t o go."ll2 The reason is not far to seek. David
106. CONG.GLOBE,39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1866). Senator William Stewart
stated that the Civil Rights Bill was designed "simply to remove the disabilities
existing by laws tending to reduce the negro to a system of peonage." Avins, supra
note 15, at 204.
107. Avins, supra note 15, at 121.
108. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966).
109. Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Response to Michael
Zuckert, 26 GA. L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1991). Justice Bradley, a contemporary of the
Fourteenth Amendment, declared that the "first section of the bill covers the same
ground as the fourteenth amendment." Live-stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v.
Crescent City Live-stack Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655
(C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408).
110. CONG.GLOBE,39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866) (emphasis added).
111. Avins, supra note 15, at 193.
112. CONG.GLOBE,39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2699 (1866).
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Donald, a Reconstruction historian, observed that the
suggestion that "Negroes should be treated as equals to white
men awoke some of the deepest and ugliest fears in the
American mind."113 George Julian noted that "we hate the
Negro," a sentiment voiced by others.ll4 Vann Woodward
found that popular convictions were not prepared to sustain "a
guarantee of eq~ality.""~This was acknowledged by two
leaders, Thaddeus Stevens and Senator William Fessenden.
Towards the end of the debates, Stevens exclaimed that he had
hoped that the people "would have so remodelled our
institutions as to have freed them from every vestige of . . .
inequality of rights . . . that no distinction would be
tolerated. . . . This bright dream has vanished. . . . [Wle shall
be obliged t o be content with patching up the worst portions of
the ancient edifi~e.""~So too, Fessenden recognized that 'We
cannot put into the Constitution, owing t o existing prejudices
and existing institutions [racism and States rights], an entire
exclusion of all class distinction^."^^' Whatever the scope of
equal protection, the two "achievements" of the Warren
Court--desegregation and suffrage-were excluded. No amount
of theorizing can wipe out these facts.
Brest maintains, however, that "our traditions are quite
re~ilient.""~
But Justice Holrnes said on behalf of the Court,
"If a thing has been practised for two hundred years by
common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth
Amendment to affect it."'l9 True it is that under the WarrenBrennan-Thurgood Marshall axis, tradition was made
"resilient7'-a euphemism for wholesale jettisoning of precedent
and of judicial revision of the Constitution. It is no answer that
Justice Harlan said that our Constitutional tradition is a
'living" one.lzOMore closely in point is his reproach that
"[wlhen the Court disregards the express intent and
understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the
political proc&s t o which the amending power was committed,
and it has violated the Constitutional structure which is its

DAVIDDONALD,
CHARLES
SUMNER
AND THE RIGHTSOF MAN 156-57 (1970).
BERGER,supra note 99, at 13.
C. VANN WOODWARD,
THE BURDENOF SLAVERY
83 (1960).
Avins, supm note 15, at 237.
CONG.GLOBE,39th Cong., 1st Sess. 705 (1866) (emphasis added).
Brest I, supra note 1, at 22.
Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S.22, 31 (1922).
Brest I, supra note 1, at 22.
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highest duty to protect."12' There in a nutshell is orighalist
doctrine.
Today a fashionable analytical tool is "levels of generality,"
in Brest's words, "On what level of generality should an
interpreter try t o ascertain and apply the adopters'
intention^?"'^^ Robert Bork notes that a judge "can
manipulate the levels of generality a t which he states the
Framers' principles."'* Some "principles," e.g. the exclusion
of suffrage from the Fourteenth Amendment, so clearly reflect
the framers' intention that t o manipulate this incontrovertible
exclusion would be subversive. Chief Justice Warren's
derivation of "one person-one vote" from the Fourteenth
Amendmentla is not an instance of the manipulation of
levels of generality, but rather exemplifies raw fiat.
"[A]bstractions," wrote Jacques Barzun, "form a ladder which
takes the climber into the clouds, where diagnostic differences
disappear."'* He adds that "at a high enough rung on the
ladder of abstraction, disparate things become the same: a song
and a spinning top are, after all, but two ways of setting air
waves in motion."'" Resorting t o levels of generality is
merely a device to escape from the bonds of the particulars.
Concretely, Mark Tushnet asks, "why describe the concept of
equality on a level of generality so high that it obliterates the
specific intention to permit ~egregation?"'~'More importantly,
when a judge ascends to high levels of generality, Bork
observes, "he creates a concept without limits,"la thereby
violating the Founders' purpose t o limit the delegated
powers.lm
A prime duty of a scholar is to take account of discrepant
evidence? Brest resolutely turns his back on facts which

121. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 US. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
122. Brest I, supra note 1, at 18.
THE CONSITPUTION
AND
123. Robert Bork, Foreword to GARYL. MCDOWELL,
CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORYat xi (1985).
124. Reynolds v. Sirns, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 576 (1964).
125. JACQUES
A STROLLWITH WIU~AMJAMES59 (1983).
BARZUN,
126. Id. at 65.
127. Mark V. Tushnet, FoUou,ing the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791 (1983).
128. Bork, supm note 123, at x.
129. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.(1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
S
(David
130. HERBEWBUITERFIELD,GEORGEIU AND THE H I ~ R I A N 225
Cannadine ed., Cassell Publishers Ltd. 1988) (1957).
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puncture his theorizing. He never really attempts to meet the
case for the opposition. Is the "irrefutable and unanswered"
exclusion of suffrage from the Fourteenth Amendment merely
"In the Eyes of the Beholder?" Brest's neglect to meet such
evidence exhibits a failure to live up to Thomas Huxley's
standard for scientific inquiry: "[Mly colleagues have learned to
respect nothing but evidence, and t o believe that their highest
duty lies in submitting to it, however it may jar against their

inclination^."'^^

-

-

131. HOMERW. SMITH,MAN AND HIS GODS372 (1953) (citation omitted).

